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Abstract—In the vein of the recent “pretty strong” converse
for the quantum and private capacity of degradable quantum
channels [Morgan/Winter, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 60(1):317-
333, 2014], we use the same techniques, in particular the calculus
of min-entropies, to show a pretty strong converse for the private
capacity of degraded classical-quantum-quantum (cqq-)wiretap
channels, which generalize Wyner’s model of the degraded
classical wiretap channel.
While the result is not completely tight, leaving some gap
between the region of error and privacy parameters for which
the converse bound holds, and a larger no-go region, it represents
a further step towards an understanding of strong converses of
wiretap channels [cf. Hayashi/Tyagi/Watanabe, arXiv:1410.0443
for the classical case].
Index Terms—quantum information, private capacity, strong
converse, smooth min-entropies.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most outstanding successes of Shannon the-
ory [23] is Shannon’s information theoretic treatment of
cryptography [24], and the further development at the hands
of Wyner, who introduced the wiretap channel model [36].
While the achievability part for the wiretap channel is a well-
understood combination of channel coding and privacy ampli-
fication techniques, the converse, even the weak converse, of
the generalized wiretap channel required a new idea in Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner’s contribution [3].
Characteristically, for multi-user scenarios strong converses
are hard to come by and not known in many instances. The
presence of an adversary in the wiretap setting, albeit a passive
one, makes the wiretap capacity a multi-user problem, and
until recently only weak converses were known for Wyner’s
original problem [3], [36]. The same was is true for the “static”
versions of distillation of shared secret key between Alice and
Bob from a prior three-way correlation with Eve [1], [18],
where Tyagi and Narayan [28], Tyagi and Watanabe [29],
and Watanabe and Hayashi [33] made progress only recently.
Most recently, Hayashi, Tyagi and Watanabe [15] (see also
their [14]) have given an elegant, very insightful analysis of
strong converse rates for general classical wiretap channels,
yielding the complete strong converse in the degraded case.
Here, we extend their results somewhat to the quantum case,
looking at wiretap channels with classical input but quantum
outputs, so-called cqq-wiretap channels. Instead of the elegant
hypothesis testing method developed in [15], we use a rather
more blunt tool, the min-entropy calculus [22], [27]. Hence,
while we can treat channels not amenable to the method
of [15], we do not reach a complete understanding of the full
tradeoff between decoding error and privacy.
II. CQQ-WIRETAP CHANNEL AND STRONG CONVERSE
The model we consider is that of a discrete memoryless
cqq-wiretap channel:
W : X −→ S(B ⊗ E)
x 7−→ ρBEx ,
with a finite set X and finite dimensional Hilbert spaces B
and E, of legal user and eavesdropper, respectively. Further-
more, we shall assume most of the time that the channel is
degraded, meaning that there exists a quantum channel (cptp
map) D : L(B) → L(E) such that ρEx = D(ρBx ) for all
x ∈ X . Introducing a Stinespring dilation of D by an isometry
V : B ↪→ E′ ⊗ F , we have ρE′x = TrF V ρBx V †.
The objective of wiretap coding is for Alice to encode
messages in such a way that Bob can decode with small error
probability, and that Eve cannot distinguish messages except
with small probability. To quantify errors, we use the purified
distance
P (ρ, σ) =
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2,
with the fidelity F (ρ, σ) = ‖√ρ√σ‖1 between quantum
states [16], [30], see [27].
An n-block code of transmission error  and privacy error
δ for W consists of a stochastic map E : [M ] −→ Xn and a
POVM D = (Du)Mu=1 on B
n, such that for
ρUÛE
n
=
1
M
∑
u,uˆ,xn
E(xn|u)|u〉〈u|U ⊗ |uˆ〉〈uˆ|Û
⊗ TrBn
[
ρB
nEn
xn (Duˆ ⊗ 1 )
]
,
the following hold:
P (ρUÛ ,∆UÛ ) ≤ , (1)
P (ρUE
n
,∆U ⊗ ρ˜En) ≤ δ. (2)
Here, ∆UÛ = 1M
∑
u |u〉〈u|U ⊗ |u〉〈u|Û , so that ∆U is the
maximally mixed state, and ρ˜E
n
is a suitable state on En.
The largest number M of messages under these conditions is
denoted M(n, , δ). Then, the private capacity is defined as the
largest asymptotically achievable rate such that transmission
error and privacy error vanish in the limit, i.e.
P (W ) := inf
,δ>0
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logM(n, , δ).
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Theorem 1 (Devetak [6]; Cai/Winter/Yeung [2]) Let W be
a cqq-wiretap channel. Then its private capacity is given by
P (W ) = supn
1
nP
(1)(W⊗n), where
P (1)(W ) = max I(U : B)− I(U : E).
Here, the maximum is over joint distributions PUX of the
channel input X and an auxiliary variable U , and the mutual
informations are with respect to the state
ρUXBE =
∑
u,x
PUX(u, x)|u〉〈u|U ⊗ |x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρBEx .
For degraded channels, it is given by the single-letter formula
P (W ) = P (1)(W ) = max I(X : F |E′),
where the maximum is over distributions PX of the channel
input, and the conditional mutual information is with respect
to the state
ρXE
′FE =
∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x|X(V ⊗ 1 )ρBEx (V ⊗ 1 )†.
In other words, w.l.o.g. one may assume U = X , and the
regularization is not necessary [13, Appendix A]. 
For completeness, we recall here the definition of the
quantum information quantities: For a state ρ on a quantum
system X , the entropy is S(X) = S(ρX) = −Tr ρ log ρ,
the mutual information for a bipartite state ρXY is I(X :
Y ) = S(X) + S(Y ) − S(XY ), and the conditional mutual
information for a tripartite state ρXY Z is I(X : Y |Z) =
S(XZ) + S(Y Z)− S(Z)− S(XY Z).
It seems to be unknown whether in the cqq-wiretap channel
setting the regularization above is necessary, but it is quite
clear that the single-letterization in the classical case, by
Csiszar and Ko¨rner [3], does not work, due to the use of
chain rules, we would get information quantities conditioned
on quantum registers. Furthermore, the results of Smith, Renes
and Smolin [26] suggest that P (1) does not give the private
capacity. On the other hand, in the general quantum channel
case [2] it is well-known that the regularization is necessary:
For an isometry, such that Eve’s channel is the complementary
channel to Bob’s, there are instances where P (1) is strictly
smaller than P [11], [17], [25], [26]. Also if the eavesdropper’s
channel is a degraded version (even trivially) of the authorized
channel, and the latter is quantum, P (1) can be strictly smaller
than P , as observed in [13].
Here we show the following pretty strong converse:
Theorem 2 Let W : X → S(B ⊗ E) be a degraded cqq-
wiretap channel and , δ ≥ 0 such that + 2δ < 1, then
logM(n, , δ) ≤ nP (W ) +O(√n log n),
where the implicit constant only depends on 1 −  − 2δ. In
particular, under the above assumptions,
lim
n→∞
1
n
logM(n, , δ) = P (W ).
Its proof relies on the calculus of min- and max-entropies,
of which we will briefly review the necessary definitions and
properties; cf. [27] for more details.
Definition 3 (Min- and max-entropy) For ρAB ∈ S≤(AB),
the min-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
Hmin(A|B)ρ := max
σB∈S(B)
max{λ ∈ R : ρAB ≤ 2−λ1 ⊗ σB}.
With a purification |ψ〉ABC of ρ, we define
Hmax(A|B)ρ := −Hmin(A|C)ψAC ,
with the reduced state ψAC = TrB ψ.
Definition 4 (Smooth min- and max-entropy) Let  ≥ 0
and ρAB ∈ S(AB). The -smooth min-entropy of A con-
ditioned on B is defined as
Hmin(A|B)ρ := max
ρ′≈ρ
Hmin(A|B)ρ′ ,
where ρ′ ≈ ρ means P (ρ′, ρ) ≤  for ρ′ ∈ S≤(AB).
Similarly,
Hmax(A|B)ψ := min
ρ′≈ρ
Hmax(A|B)ρ′
= −Hmin(A|C)ψ,
with a purification ψ ∈ S(ABC) of ρ.
All min- and max-entropies, smoothed or not, are invariant
under local unitaries and local isometries.
The following two lemmas show that min- and max-
entropies have properties close to those of the von Neumann
entropy.
Lemma 5 (Data processing) For ρ ∈ S(ABC) and  ≥ 0,
Hmin(A|BC) ≤ Hmin(A|B),
Hmax(A|BC) ≤ Hmax(A|B). 
Lemma 6 (Chain rules [10], [31]) Let , δ ≥ 0, η > 0.
Then, with respect to the same state ρ ∈ S(ABC),
H+2δ+ηmax (AB|C)≤Hδmax(B|C)+Hmax(A|BC) + log
2
η2
,
(3)
Hmax(AB|C)≥Hδmin(B|C)+H+2δ+2ηmax (A|BC)− 3 log
2
η2
. 
(4)
Proof of Theorem 2: We follow closely the initial
steps of the analysis in [19, Thm. 14]. Consider an n-block
code with M messages, and transmission and privacy error
 and is δ: message u (chosen uniformly) is encoded by a
distribution E(xn|u) and sent through the channel, giving rise
to a ccqq-state between message U , input Xn, output Bn and
environment En:
ρUX
nBnEn =
1
M
∑
u,xn
E(xn|u)|u〉〈u|U⊗|xn〉〈xn|Xn⊗ρBnEnxn .
The “trivial” converse shows that
logM ≤ Hδmin(U |En)−Hmax(U |Bn),
cf. Renes and Renner [21]. Namely, according to the def-
inition of privacy given above, the reduced state ρUE
n
is
within purified distance δ of a product state of the form
1
M
∑
u |u〉〈u|U ⊗ ρ˜E
n
, hence Hδmin(U |En) ≥ logM . Like-
wise, there exists a decoding cptp map D : L(Bn) → Û
such that (id ⊗ D)ρUBn is within  purified distance from
the perfectly correlated state 1M
∑
u |u〉〈u|U ⊗ |u〉〈u|Û , hence
Hmax(U |Bn) ≤ 0.
We apply the Stinespring dilation of the degrading map to
ρ, yielding
ωUX
nE′nFnEn
=
1
M
∑
u,xn
E(xn|u)|u〉〈u|U ⊗ |xn〉〈xn|Xn ⊗ V ⊗nρBnEnxn V †
⊗n
.
With respect to this state, we now have (cf. Eq. (18) of [19]),
logM ≤ Hδmin(U |En)−Hmax(U |E′nFn)
= Hδmin(U |E′n)−Hmax(U |E′nFn)
≤ Hηmax(Fn|E′n)−H+2δ+5ηmax (Fn|E′nU) + 4 log
2
η2
≤ Hηmax(Fn|E′n)−Hλmax(Fn|E′nXn) + 4 log
2
η2
,
(5)
with λ :=  + 2δ + 5η. Here we have used the degradability
property of the channel in the second line, in the third
line twice the chain rule for min-/max-entropies [Lemma 6,
Eqs. (3) and (4)], and in the last line data processing
(Lemma 5) for the max-entropy. Indeed,
H+3ηmax (AB|C) ≤ Hηmax(A|C) +Hmax(B|AC) + log
2
η2
‖
Hκmax(AB|C) ≥ Hδmin(B|C) +Hκ+2δ+2ηmax (A|BC)− 3 log
2
η2
,
which we apply with Fn ≡ A, U ≡ B and E′n ≡ C, and
with κ = + 3η.
Now, assume for simplicity that the distribution of Xn,
i.e. the density ωX
n
, is supported on a single type class
τ(P0) =
{
xn : ∀x F (x|xn) = P0(x)
}
,
where F (x|xn) is the relative requency of the letter x occur-
ring in xn. With this assumption we show how to bound the
max-entropy terms on the r.h.s. of Eq. (5). Namely, all xn
having non-zero probability are permutations of a fiducial xn0 .
Hence, on the one hand, we have
Hλmax(F
n|E′nXn)ω ≥ H λ̂max(Fn|E′n)ρxn0
≥ n
∑
x
P0(x)S(F |E′)ρx −O
(√
n
)
,
by Lemma 7 (quasi-concavity of max-entropy) below, with
λ̂ = λ
√
2− λ2 < 1, and a simple extension of Proposition 8
(asymptotic equipartition property) to a product of blocks of
i.i.d. states ρ⊗nP0(x)x . On the other hand, going to the Sn-
symmetrized state
ΩX
nE′nFnEn =
1
|τ(P0)|
∑
xn∈τ(P0)
|xn〉〈xn|Xn⊗V ⊗nρBnEnxn V †
⊗n
,
we have, once more invoking Lemma 7,
Hηmax(F
n|E′n)ω ≤ Hη/
√
2
max (F
n|E′n)Ω
≤ H1− 18η
2
min (F
n|E′n)Ω,
where in the second line we have used Lemma 10. Now,
the uniform distribution ΥP0 on the type class τ(P0) has the
property ΥP0 ≤ (n + 1)|X |P⊗n0 , because it is on P0 that the
probability weight of type classes of P⊗n0 peaks, and so
Ω ≤ (n+ 1)|X |(ΘXE′FE)⊗n,
with
ΘXE
′FE =
∑
x
P0(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ V ρBEx V †.
Thus, using the same reasoning as in the proof of [19, Thm. 2],
we get
Hηmax(F
n|E′n)ω ≤ H1−
1
16η
2(n+1)−|X|
min (F
n|E′n)Θ⊗n
≤ H 132η
2(n+1)−|X|
max (F
n|E′n)Θ⊗n
≤ nS(F |E′)Θ +O
(√
n log n
)
,
where we have once more invoked the AEP, Proposition 8.
Inserting these upper and lower bounds into Eq. (5), we find
logM ≤ nI(X : F |E′) +O(√n log n).
Now we face the case of general encodings, and reduce it to
the above form of constant type. Introduce another register T
holding the type t(xn) of xn, of dimension |T | ≤ (n+ 1)|X |,
so that we have an extended joint state
ρUX
nBnEnT =
1
M
∑
u,xn
E(xn|u)|u〉〈u|U ⊗ |xn〉〈xn|Xn
⊗ ρBnEnxn ⊗ |t(xn)〉〈t(xn)|T .
Imagine that T is handed to the eavesdropper; this clearly
doesn’t increase Bob’s decoding error, but it can affect the
privacy of the code. The idea is, however, that since log |T | ≤
O(log n), we can rectify this by hashing out O(log n) of the
message, and the remainder will be almost as private as the
original code: Indeed, let ′ =  + 2ϑ and δ = δ + 2ϑ, such
that still ′ + 2δ′ < 1, however. Partition [M ] randomly into
N =
⌊
M
L
⌋
sets Lu′ of equal size L = poly
(
log n, ϑ−1
)
, up
to a rest of size smaller than L, so that we can label the
elements of
⋃
u′ Lu′ by pairs (u′, v) ∈ [N ]× [L]. Compute U ′
as a function of U (except for an event of probability ≤ 1N ),
so that we obtain a joint state
ρ˜U
′XnBnEnT =
1
N
∑
u′,v,xn
1
L
E(xn|u′, v)|u′〉〈u′|U ′ ⊗ |xn〉〈xn|Xn
⊗ ρBnEnxn ⊗ |t(xn)〉〈t(xn)|T
=
1
N
∑
u′,xn
E˜(xn|u′)|u′〉〈u′|U ′ ⊗ |xn〉〈xn|Xn
⊗ ρBnEnxn ⊗ |t(xn)T 〉〈t(xn)T |,
where E˜(xn|u′) = 1L
∑
v E(x
n|u′, v). This is a new code:
By the properties of random hashing, with high probability,
Bob can apply the same decoding as in the original code
to obtain an error ≤  + ϑ, and the privacy error for the
combined register EnT is ≤ δ + ϑ. Furthermore, the privacy
error of the register T alone is ≤ ϑ. This has the important
consequence that we can modify the encoding E˜(xn|u′) to a
slightly different one E′(xn|u′) = Q(t(xn))E′(xn|u′, t(xn)),
with a universal distribution Q over the types, such that
ρ′U
′XnBnEnT
=
1
N
∑
u′,xn
E′(xn|u′)|u′〉〈u′|U ′ ⊗ |xn〉〈xn|Xn
⊗ ρBnEnxn ⊗ |t(xn)〉〈t(xn)|
=
1
N
∑
P0 type
∑
u′,xn∈τ(P0)
E′(xn|u′, P0)|u′〉〈u′|U ′ ⊗ |xn〉〈xn|Xn
⊗ ρBnEnxn ⊗Q(P0)|P0〉〈P0|T
fulfills the decoding and eavesdropper constraints with trans-
mission error ′ and privacy error δ′, and has a perfectly
independent type-register T .
Consider now the codes obtained by using E′(·|·, P0) for a
fixed P0 (but always the same decoder for Bob). These have
transmission errors (P0) and privacy errors δ(P0). By the
direct sum over types P0 – with probability Q(P0) –, and the
concavity of
√
1− x2, one can see that
′ ≥
∑
P0 type
Q(P0)(P0), δ
′ ≥
∑
P0 type
Q(P0)δ(P0),
and so ∑
P0 type
Q(P0)[(P0) + 2δ(P0)] ≤ ′ + 2δ′ < 1,
and so there must exist a type P0 such that the encoding
E′(·|·, P0) has (P0) + 2δ(P0) ≤ ′ + 2δ′ < 1. But this code
has only O(log n) less information in the message, and has
the property that the encoder maps only into the type class
τ(P0), hence can use the previous bound:
logM ≤ logN +O(log n) ≤ nI(X : F |E′) +O(√n log n),
concluding the proof.
Lemma 7 (Lemma 10 in [19]) Let ρ ∈ S(AB) be a state
and consider the state family ρABi = (Ui ⊗ Vi)ρ(Ui ⊗ Vi)†,
with unitaries Ui on A and Vi on B, and probabilities pi;
define ρ :=
∑
i piρi. Then, with ̂ = 
√
2− 2 ≤ √2,
Hmax(A|B)ρ ≥ H ̂max(A|B)ρ. 
Proposition 8 (Min- and max-entropy AEP [22], [27])
Let ρ ∈ S(HAB) and 0 <  < 1. Then,
lim
n→∞
1
n
Hmin(A
n|Bn)ρ⊗n = S(A|B)ρ
= lim
n→∞
1
n
Hmax(A
n|Bn)ρ⊗n .
More precisely, for a purification |ψ〉 ∈ ABC of ρ, denote
µX := log
∥∥(ψX)−1∥∥, where the inverse is the generalized
inverse (restricted to the support), for X = B,C. Then, for
every n,
Hmin(A
n|Bn) ≥ nS(A|B)− (µB + µC)
√
n ln
2

,
Hmax(A
n|Bn) ≤ nS(A|B) + (µB + µC)
√
n ln
2

,
and similar opposite bounds via Lemma 9. 
Lemma 9 (Proposition 5.5 in [27]) Let ρ ∈ S(AB) and
α, β ≥ 0 such that α+ β < pi2 . Then,
Hsinαmin (A|B)ρ ≤ Hsin βmax (A|B)ρ + log
1
cos2(α+ β)
.
For , δ ≥ 0, +δ < 1 this can be relaxed to the simpler form
Hmin(A|B)ρ ≤ Hδmax(A|B)ρ + log
1
1− (+ δ)2 . 
Lemma 10 (Dupuis [9]) Let ρ ∈ S(AB) and 0 ≤  ≤ 1.
Then,
H
√
1−4
max (A|B)ρ ≤ Hmin(A|B)ρ,
which can be rewritten and relaxed into the form (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1)
Hδmax(A|B)ρ ≤ H
4√1−δ2
min (A|B)ρ ≤ H
1− 14 δ2
min (A|B)ρ. 
III. DISCUSSION
We showed that the min-entropic machinery employed in
the analysis of degradable quantum channels [4], [7], [19], can
be used equally, if not more easily, to obtain a pretty strong
converse for degraded quantum wiretap channels of the cqq
kind; the reason for focusing on this class of channels lies in
the availability of a single-letter formula.
For degraded ccc-wiretap channels, i.e. the original Wyner
model, Hayashi, Tyagi and Watanabe [15] have found a very
elegant argument, via hypothesis testing, to give the tighter re-
sult that if +δ < 1, then limn→∞ 1n logM(n, , δ) = P (W ).
In fact, by phrasing error and privacy in terms of the trace
distance D(ρ, σ) = 12‖ρ − σ‖1 ≤ P (ρ, σ), they show that
this holds if and only if: For 1 − δ ≤  < 1 the above limit
gives the classical capacity C(W ) of the channel from Alice
to Bob. It seems however that their technique does not easily
generalize to cqq-channels, as it exploits the classical nature
of the output signals.
Similarly, if  and δ are “too big”, namely
√
1− δ2 ≤  < 1,
we can easily see that Theorem 2 breaks: In that case,
lim
n→∞
1
n
logM(n, , δ) = C(W ),
where C(W ) is the classical capacity of the cq-channel
W : x 7−→ ρBx . Namely, choose any fixed xn0 , then for an
asymptotically error-free and capacity-achieving code xn(m),
with m = 1, . . . , N = 2nC(W )−o(n), consider encoding mes-
sage m by the mixture 2|xn(m)〉〈xn(m)|+ (1− 2)|xn0 〉〈xn0 |.
This scheme has transmission error arbitrarily close to  and
privacy error ≤ √1− 2 ≤ δ.
By ignoring the privacy constraint, our Theorem 2 includes
a proof of the strong converse for the classical capacity of cq-
channels [20], [35]; simply consider a trivial eavesdropper and
δ = 0. This shows that for  < 1, the limit of 1n logM(n, , δ)
is bounded by C(W ); cf. Wang and Renner [32].
Fig. 1. Transmission error  vs. privacy error δ: Below the straight line we
have a strong converse, above the circle the strong converse cannot hold.
We leave it as an open problem to try and close the gap
between the two regimes (see Fig. 1).
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